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FEAR WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN THE SHADOW OF JIHADIST THREAT
MARCO GIANI∗
ACCEPTED IN Comparative Political Studies
Abstract. Because the prejudice of the ingroup builds into fear of the outgroup, jihadist
terrorism is expected to strengthen the politicized link between security and immigration. I
use a causal inference in a clustered cross-country analysis to test the simultaneous short-
run causal impact of the jihadist threat on security fear and ethnic prejudice of the public
in Israel, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, France, and Germany. In line with common
wisdom, jihadist attacks significantly increase security fear. Against it, jihadist attacks non-
significantly decrease ethnic prejudice. This empirical pattern holds across different types of
immigration attitudes, ethnic groups, intervals of time and terrorist events, and is robust to
placebo treatments, placebo policy preferences, fake and failed terror attacks. These findings
challenge extant consensus, and suggest that jihadist attacks, particularly at the local level,
induce risk-aversion rather than desire for retaliation.
Keywords: Race, Ethnicity and Politics, Terrorism, Migration
1 INTRODUCTION
Following 9/11, scholars became increasingly interested in how security concerns,
on top of cultural and economic ones (e.g., Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997,




Mayda, 2006, Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014, Valentino et al., 2017, Pardos-Prado
& Xena, 2019), shape attitudes towards immigrants and minorities (e.g., Lahav, 2010,
Legewie, 2013, Messina, 2014, Böhmelt, Bove, & Nussio, 2019). Episodes of hate
crimes (Hanes & Machin, 2014), labor (Davila & Mora, 2005), housing (Gautier, Sieg-
mann, & Van Vuuren, 2009) or institutional discrimination (Shayo & Zussman, 2011)
are thought to signal a worrisome shift in public attitudes (e.g., Elsayed & De Grip,
2018). However, whether the public at large leans with or against such discriminatory
behavior is still an open question.
This paper tests how jihadist attacks impact on the public’s “security fear” and “eth-
nic prejudice”. I propose a three-step empirical design. I begin by defining terrorist
attacks as murderous plots perpetrated by members of known jihadist organizations
and collect any attack that matches this definition from the global terrorism dataset
(GTD, 2017). I then systematically check whether any such jihadist attack happened
to have occurred during the fieldwork period of any round of the European Social
Survey (ESS, 2016). Because the timing of the interviews is as good as random with
respect to the date of each attack as they were scheduled earlier through strict ran-
dom sampling, jihadist attacks represent plausibly exogenous variation of the level of
security threat. I can hence use a causal inference in cross-country design to compare
public attitudes before (the control group) and after (the treatment group) jihadist
attacks.
Findings are as follows. In line with conventional wisdom, jihadist attacks signif-
icantly increase the public’s security fear, capturing concern for safety. Against con-
ventional wisdom, I find that jihadist attacks non-significantly decrease ethnic preju-
dice, encompassing all negative evaluations associated with immigrants and minori-
ties. This empirical pattern holds across (i) different types of immigration attitudes,
including those focusing on economic or cultural concerns, (ii) different ethnic groups,
including the Muslim, Gypsies and Jewish migrants, (iii) varying time-bandwidths
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and (iv) diverse terrorist events. After conducting several robustness checks and
placebo analyses, I conclude that the public reacts to terrorist attacks with fear with-
out prejudice.
I interpret these findings borrowing from group-threat theory. Jihadist attacks may
de-emphasize perceived group threat, which elicits desire for retaliation (see e.g.,
Lahav & Courtemanche, 2012, Kam & Kinder, 2007), while emphasizing perceived
individual threat, which elicits anxiety thereby lowering ethnocentrism (Lerner &
Keltner, 2000, Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Small, & Lerner, 2003). Although this mecha-
nism cannot be tested directly in non-experimental settings, conditioning attitudinal
patterns on threat-exposure furthers its plausibility. Among more directly exposed
respondents, who experience stronger security fear, the decrease in prejudice is more
marked and less partisan (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005, Huddy, Feldman,
& Cassese, 2009).
From a methodological perspective, I contribute to the literature on terrorism and
public opinion in two ways. Firstly, while previous research has largely focused on
the transnational effect of jihadist attacks (Finseraas, Jakobsson, & Kotsadam, 2011,
Legewie, 2013, Schüller, 2016, Nussio, Bove, & Steele, 2019), I focus on the effect
of jihadist attacks at the local level, either national or regional. In doing so, I max-
imize compliance with the treatment, increasing the internal validity of the analy-
sis. Secondly, while previous work restricts statistical inference to one case study
only (Finseraas et al., 2011, Legewie, 2013, Schüller, 2016, Nussio et al., 2019, Van
Hauwaert & Huber, 2020), I draw conclusions based on nine jihadist attacks that oc-
curred between 2002 and 2016 in Israel, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, France,
and Germany using the same empirical design. Such a design yields higher external
validity.
These methodological differences are important beyond internal and external valid-
ity; they result in findings that substantively contrast with previous literature (Fin-
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seraas et al., 2011, Legewie, 2013, Schüller, 2016, Nussio et al., 2019, for an excep-
tion see Van Hauwaert & Huber, 2020). It is often assumed that since the preju-
dice of the ingroup builds into fear of the outgroup (e.g., Quillian, 1995), stronger
outgroup-driven security threats should monotonically increase ethnic prejudice (Leg-
ewie, 2013). Seen as the behavioral counterpart of a widespread attitudinal shift,
episodes of discrimination against Muslims in the shadow of jihadist threat have re-
inforced this view (e.g., Hanes & Machin, 2014). My findings indicate that this conven-
tional wisdom should be requalified: the correlation between security fear and ethnic
prejudice, relevant in peaceful times, vanishes precisely under the most salient of all
threats. Terrorism and the fear of it thereof may thus entail an ironically positive ef-
fect on democracy because heightened risk-aversion fosters information-seeking and
reduces prejudice; “a worried citizen is a good citizen” (Valentino, Hutchings, Banks,
& Davis, 2008).
The paper proceeds as follows. Firstly, I bridge the literature on group threat theory
with that on terrorism and public opinion to set out expectations (section 2). Then I
present the empirical design (3). In doing so, I place emphasis on the various steps
that lead from the definition of terror attacks to the collection of episodes, and from
the collection of episodes to the estimation strategy (3.1). I also discuss the main
threats to identification (3.2). Section 4 presents and discusses the main results at
several levels of aggregation. Finally, section 5 highlights strengths and weaknesses
of the paper, discussing avenues for future research.
2 LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
Terrorism is generally conceptualized as requiring adjustments in the balancing of
civil liberty against national security (e.g., Waldron, 2003). However, counterterror
policies often trade-off a flagrant reduction of civil liberties against an uncertain in-
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crease in national security (e.g., Dragu, 2011). Immigration policy makes no excep-
tion. On the one hand, an immigration ban on ethnic minorities may halt the jihadist
network thereby ceteris paribus lowering long-run terrorist activity.1 On the other
hand, explicitly targeting ethnic minorities may initiate a process of risk subjectifi-
cation that alienates minorities (Mythen, Walklate, & Khan, 2013), potentially align-
ing them with the terrorist organization (Ingram, 2019) and ultimately aggravating
those political grievances that contributed to the emergence of terrorism in first place
(Walsh & Piazza, 2010, Bueno de Mesquita & Dickson, 2007).
In this context, the public is both decisive and uncertain. It is decisive because it expe-
dites or hinders the process by which immigration rules are decided “out of the realms
of conventional policy-making and into the domain of emergency politics” (Messina,
2014, p532). It is uncertain because it is exposed to a threat that activates conflicting
feelings and coping mechanisms, possibly resulting in opposite attitudinal responses.
2.1 THE PUBLIC UNDER TERROR THREAT
Group-threat theory is the single most important framework to study the attitudes
of citizens, the “ingroup”, towards immigrants and minorities, the “outgroup” (for a
review, see Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). That individuals value their own member-
ship group over groups to which they do not belong enjoys a nearly axiomatic status
(e.g., Brewer, 2007). It is equally well-established that, in a world characterized by
scarce resources, the ingroup perceives the outgroup as a threat to its privilege (Quil-
lian, 1995).
While postulating that terrorist attacks affect perceived threat is relative uncon-
tentious (Legewie, 2013), the mapping between perceived threat and attitudinal pat-
terns is far from trivial. It is characterized by (i) the relevant target of the threat
and associated psychological reactions (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, Huddy et al., 2005);
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(ii) the relevant dimension of the threat, possibly encompassing security, economic, or
cultural concerns (Canetti-Nisim, Ariely, & Halperin, 2008, Lahav & Courtemanche,
2012, Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, & Lahav, 2015); and (iii) the degree of homogeneity of
the outgroup (Pickett & Brewer, 2001, Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001).
Group vs individual threat. The most important distinction is that between group
threat and individual threat (e.g., Stephan & Stephan, 2013). The former is perceived
to target the whole group to which one belongs to without directly targeting the in-
dividual, whereas the latter is perceived to directly target the single individual and
her close ties (Rosenstein, 2008). Different target-perceptions result in different psy-
chological reactions (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), leading to opposite risk-profiles (Fis-
chhoff et al., 2003, Joslyn & Haider-Markel, 2018). On the one hand, group threat
produces anger, leading to under-estimates of the risk of intergroup conflict. On the
other hand, individual threat produces anxiety, leading to over-estimates of the risk
of intergroup conflict.
In turn, opposite risk-profiles predict opposite attitudinal adjustments (Fischhoff et
al., 2003, Huddy et al., 2005, Huddy et al., 2009). Under-estimating the risk of in-
tergroup conflict makes individuals comfortable with group-antagonism, including
e.g. authoritarianism and exclusionist political attitudes (Canetti-Nisim, Halperin,
Sharvit, & Hobfoll, 2009, Hetherington & Suhay, 2011), negative immigration atti-
tudes (Lahav & Courtemanche, 2012, Legewie, 2013), ethnocentrism (Kam & Kinder,
2007, Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008) and support for punitive actions against the
outgroup (Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001). By stark contrast, over-estimating the risk of in-
tergroup conflict leads individuals to adopt safe, conciliatory attitudes towards the
outgroup (Huddy et al., 2005).
The distinction between country and individual threat yields two competing hypothe-
ses. If group threat and desire for retaliation dominate, terrorist attacks should in-
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crease ethnic prejudice along with security fear. If individual threat and anxiety
dominate, terrorist attacks should successfully spread security fear without increas-
ing ethnic prejudice.
While disentangling the group and individual component of perceived threat is dif-
ficult in non-experimental settings, there exist two indirect, complementary ways to
test the consistency of the proposed mechanism. Firstly, we should expect more di-
rectly targeted individuals to experience stronger anxiety under terror threat. Follow-
ing 9/11, residents in the New York metropolitan area displayed substantially higher
anxiety relative to residents in the North-East. This led them to oppose risky policies
that would have retaliated against Arab communities (Huddy et al., 2005). Secondly,
we should expect more anxious individuals to forgo ideological processing. Follow-
ing the Orlando shooting, anxious liberals and anxious conservatives aligned on key
political and policy attitudes related with mass-shooting (Joslyn & Haider-Markel,
2018).
To summarize, the aggregate effect of jihadist threat on ethnic prejudice is ambigu-
ous. Jihadist threat is more likely to increase ethnic prejudice and to ideologically
polarize among weakly exposed individuals.2 Instead, focusing on the local effect of
jihadist attacks should lead to nonpartisan, risk-averse public opinion responses.
Realistic vs symbolic threat. Whether it targets the group or the individual,
threat is multidimensional; it is realistic if it harms physical safety or wealth and
symbolic if it harms the ingroup’s cultural identity (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006).
Canetti-Nisim et al. (2008) argue that security threats affect attitudes towards ethnic
minorities more directly than economic or cultural threats do (Canetti-Nisim et al.,
2008). Assuming that jihadist terrorism represents a security threat, we should ex-
pect it to affect those immigration attitudes that capture ethnocentrism, rather than
those that proxy cultural or economic concerns (Kam & Kinder, 2007).
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However, jihadist terrorism also affects the economy (e.g., Dixon, Rimmer, Wittwer,
Rose, & Heatwole, 2017), informs about changes in power relationships among na-
tions (e.g., Findley, Piazza, & Young, 2012), and heightens both social cleavages, by
reducing trust (Geys & Qari, 2017a), and cultural cleavages, by making stereotypes
salient (e.g., Obaidi, Kunst, Kteily, Thomsen, & Sidanius, 2018). The multifaceted na-
ture of terrorism as a social phenomenon, together with the strong correlation among
different types of immigration attitudes (see e.g., Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015), mean
that jihadist attacks may ultimately affect different immigration attitudes in a simi-
lar way (e.g., Finseraas et al., 2011, Legewie, 2013).
Following the idea that terrorism is mainly a security threat, I focus on those immi-
gration attitudes that more directly account for ethnic prejudice. However, acknowl-
edging that threat is multidimensional, I also consider those immigration attitudes
that weigh economic or cultural concerns, expecting them to evolve with a similar
dynamic.
Homogeneous vs differentiated outgroup. The threatening outgroup can be
perceived as homogeneous or specific. Intuitively, attitudinal changes should be lim-
ited to attitudes towards Muslims in the context of jihadist terrorism. Three related
observations cast doubt on such intuition. The construction of social identity reflects
both the desire to assimilate with an ingroup and the desire to differentiate with
respect to an outgroup (Brewer, 1991). In turn, stressing intragroup similarities ac-
commodates the desire to assimilate, whereas stressing social distance with respect
to the outgroup accommodates the desire for distinctiveness (Rothgerber, 1997). And
since intergroup threat broadens the scope for group cohesion, it also strengthens
desire for both assimilation and distinctiveness, leading to the refining of ingroup
membership and, correspondingly, to the perception of greater outgroup homogeneity
(Pickett & Brewer, 2001).
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The empirical literature backs perceived group homogeneity in several contexts. The
seminal contribution of Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001 provides evidence for the effect of
threat on perceived group homogeneity within the context of terrorism in Israel. Bar-
Tal & Labin, 2001 find that during peaceful times, Israeli teenagers generally hold
a specific ethnoracial hierarchy of groups, based on threat levels, placing Jordani-
ans above Arabs, and Arabs above Palestinians. However, when asked to complete
the same survey following a series of terrorist attacks carried upon by the Palestini-
ans, their ethnic prejudice increases similarly across different groups. Focusing on
the case of Spain, Echebarria-Echabe & Fernandez-Guede, 2006 reinforce this result.
They show that the jihadist attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004 increased anti-Arab
and anti-Semitic prejudice in a similar manner. Such a homogenization effect may
be furthered by the parallel effect of threat on authoritarianism (Canetti-Nisim et
al., 2008). As put by Joshua Legewie, “Islamic terrorism precipitated a debate about
immigrants and immigration in general” (Legewie, 2013, p1202). Consistently, the
empirical work in the literature of terrorism and public opinion to which I connect
to does not make a distinction between Muslims and other groups (Finseraas et al.,
2011, Schüller, 2016, Nussio et al., 2019).
Considering existing theory and evidence, I expect the ingroup to perceive greater
outgroup homogeneity. Changes in ethnic prejudice should be thus be similar across
different ethnic groups. I test for outgroup homogeneity by comparing the dynamic of
ethnic prejudice against ethnic Muslims, Gypsies, and Jews.
3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The GTD defines terror(ist) attacks as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force
and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social
goal through fear, coercion or intimidation”. I confine the focus on (i) terrorist plots
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(ii) where at least one person is killed (iii) carried out by members of jihadist organi-
zations. Each building block of the proposed definition fulfills desirable identification
features. I focus on (i) terrorist plots to distinguish actual terrorist attacks from
episodes of crime perpetrated by Muslims. I focus on (ii) murderous attacks to dis-
tinguish the major security threats from minor ones. Finally, I focus on (iii) terrorist
attacks perpetrated by affiliated members to restrict attention to international ter-
rorism. The appendix provides detailed examples of jihadist attacks that match each
of the building blocks of my definition, as well as examples of episodes that do not
qualify as jihadist attacks given my definition.3
I systematically check whether each such jihadist attack recorded in the Global Ter-
rorism Dataset (GTD), which globally includes about 170, 000 terrorist attacks, hap-
pened to have coincided with the survey fieldwork period of the targeted country
scheduled by the European Social survey (ESS), which includes about 25 countries
in eight waves ranging from 2002 to 2016. Importantly, given the focus on the local
rather than transnational terrorism, I only retain those jihadist attacks perpetrated
in a particular country that occurred during the fieldwork period of that same country.
By doing so, I am able to collect nine jihadist attacks of heterogeneous magnitude that
occurred in Israel, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, France and Germany between
2003 and 2016.
These attacks are briefly summarized in the caption of Figure 1, which plots the daily
distribution of survey collection around each attack. In Figure 1, the gray spikes
give the density of the daily survey collection whereas the black dashed spike is the
date at which each attack took place. Individuals interviewed before any attack are
in the control group. Vice-versa, individuals interviewed after any attack are in the
treatment group.
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FIGURE 1: DATA COLLECTION AROUND TERRORIST ATTACKS.
(A) Israel, 2003. On January 5, two
suicide bombers from Al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigade killed 22 in Tel Aviv. Deadliest
attack in Israel since March 2002.
(B) Netherlands, 2004. On Novem-
ber 2, a member of the ductch Islamist
group Hofstad network killed the Dutch
film maker Theo Van Gogh in Amster-
dam.
(C) Russia, 2008. On December 3,
members of Caucasus Emirate fired
upon civilians, killing three in Agishty,
Chechnya.
(D) Sweden, 2010. On December 11,
a member of Al Quaeda set two bombs
in central Stockholm, killing himself
and injuring two. Thought as the first
suicide attack in the Nordic countries
linked to Islamic terrorism.
(E) Russia, 2011. On January 24, a
suicide bomber from Caucasus Emirate
killed 38 at Moscow airport. Deadliest
terrorist attack in Russia since Novem-
ber 2004.
(F) Israel, 2012. On November 15, a
member of Hamas killed three civilians
in Kiryat Malachi city.
(G) France, 2015. On January 7, two
members of Al Quaeda killed 12 at the
headquarters of Charlie Hebdo, Paris.
The day after, one policeman and four
Jews are also killed. Third deadliest at-
tack in France since at least 1972.
(H) Israel, 2015. On October 7, a mem-
ber of Hamas stabbed an Israel Defense
Forces (IDF) soldier in Kiryat Gat city
and is killed.
(I) Germany, 2016. On December 19,
a member of Isis drove a truck into a
Christmas market in Breithscheidplatz
killing 12 people, Berlin.
gfdg
Notes. For each attack, the grey spikes give the density of the daily survey collection. The black dashed
spike is the date at which each attack took place. Units interviewed in the same day as the attack are
deleted. Source: European Social Survey (ESS), rounds 1 to 8, and the Global Terrorism Dataset
(GTD), from which the descriptions are taken.
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3.1 DATA AND ESTIMATION
Individual-level data come from eight rounds of the ESS. The survey was constructed
using strict random probability sampling. In the ESS, an interview is conducted face
to face and usually lasts for about one hour. The dataset combines detailed infor-
mation about the socioeconomic status of the respondents with a variety of items on
political orientations. The ESS sampling guidelines establish that random probabil-
ity methods must be chosen at each stage and that quota sampling or substitution of
the non-respondents is not permitted at any point in time. Further details regarding
the survey design are discussed in the appendix (A.2.1).
I begin by testing whether jihadist attacks cause the public to jointly increase security
fear and ethnic prejudice. To proxy the security fear, I use the following item:
“It is important that the government ensures safety against all threats. The
state must be strong so it can defend its citizens.” (0) “Completely disagree” to
(5) “Completely agree”;
Sharp changes in this survey item should reflect the effectiveness of jihadist attacks
in spreading fear. In appendix, I consider an alternative item that does not refer to
government intervention (see A.4.2).
To proxy the ethnic prejudice, I use the following items:
To what extent do you think your country should allow people of the different
race or ethnic group as most country’s people to come and live here? 1: “Allow
many” to 4: “Allow none”;
To what extent do you think your country should allow people of the same race
or ethnic group as most country’s people to come and live here? 1: “Allow many”
to 4: “Allow none”.
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The succession of the two questions explicitly primes the role of race/ethnicity, and
the two questions only differ in the race dimension. I generate the variable ethnic
prejudice as follows:
Oppose migrants of different ethnicity − Oppose migrants of same ethnicity.
While traditional definitions of “prejudice” emphasize the preconceived nature of neg-
ative attitudes (Allport, Clark, & Pettigrew, 1954), recent conceptualizations incorpo-
rate functional and experiential aspects of prejudice (Dovidio, Schellhaas, & Pearson,
2019) to encompass all negative emotion or evaluation associated with immigrants
and minorities (Stephan & Stephan, 2013).
Hypothesis testing yields four possible scenarios:
Fear with prejudice: Jihadist attacks increase security fear and ethnic prejudice;
Prejudice without fear: Jihadist attacks increase ethnic prejudice only;
Fear without prejudice: Jihadist attacks increase security fear only;
Terrorist attacks are ineffective.
Figure 2 provides the normalized distribution of the two dependent variables for the
control and treatment group. The left panel of Figure 2 shows that security fear has
higher mean and lower standard deviation after terrorist attacks. The right panel of
Figure 2 shows that ethnic prejudice has lower mean higher standard deviation after
terrorist attacks.
I estimate the following equation:
yi,g = α + βTi,g + γ
′xi,g + θg + µi,g.
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FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES.
(A) Security fear. Before terrorist attacks,
the mean is 3.733 and the standard deviation
is 1.251 (10,407 observations). After the at-
tack, the mean is 3.882 and the standard de-
viation is 1.162 (6,387 observations).
(B) Ethnic prejudice. Before terrorist attacks,
the mean is 3.620 and the standard deviation
is .962 (10,342 observations). After the attack,
the mean is 3.673 and the standard deviation is
1.020 (6,151 observations).
gdf
Notes. Normalized distribution of the two dependent variables before (regular line) and after (dashed
line) terrorist attacks. Source: ESS.
yi,g is the score in each dependent variable for unit i is in country-year g. α is the
intercept whereas β is the “terror treatment effect”. Ti,g is the treatment indicator. It
takes value 1 if the unit was interviewed after the terrorist attack and 0 otherwise.
The choice of time bandwidths is necessarily arbitrary. A short bandwidth maximizes
the plausibility of attributing of the observed pattern to the terrorist event. A longer
bandwidth, however, permits to gain statistical power. I balance out attribution and
statistical power using a 15 days bandwidth for the main analysis, providing sensitiv-
ity analysis in section 3.2.
The empirical specification includes a vector of baseline individual covariates, xi,g.
The set of sociodemographic control variables include income decile (1 − 10), educa-
tion attainment (1− 7), gender (0− 1), age (15− 99) and squared age, household status
(children living at home vs. no child living at home), immigration background (ei-
ther the individual, his or her mother or father or both born in a different country),
the employment status (employed vs. unemployed), and domicile fixed effects (where
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0 represents big city and 4 represents the rural countryside). θg is a country-year
specific intercept and µi,g is the error term.
To ease the interpretation of the terror treatment effects, the model is fit through
OLS. Non-linear models may provide a better fit to the data generating process, and
they are considered in appendix (A.3.3). Finally, I use robust standard errors and
discuss some clustering strategies in appendix (A.3.4, A.3.5).
3.2 THREATS TO IDENTIFICATION
The empirical design proposed here is subject to three major threats to identification
that I briefly discuss and extensively cover in the appendix.4
Conditional ignorability: The respondents’ treatment status should be independent
of their potential outcomes, which are conditional on a set of covariates. Two major
threats to conditional ignorability are addressed: (i) imbalance and (ii) attrition. (i)
The actual treatment assignment reflects a set of sampling decisions, possibly result-
ing in an imbalance between the control and treatment groups. For instance, the
easier it is to reach a respondent, the more likely that she or he is in the control
group (Legewie, 2013). I address both the imbalance in the covariates and in geo-
graphic units (A.2.1). If the regions were sampled at different points in time, the
outcomes could be biased by a regional imbalance.5 I deal with imbalance in the co-
variates and geographic units by combining entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012)
with outliers’ deletion through pretreatment coarsened exact matching (King, Black-
well, Iacus, & Porro, 2010, Iacus, King, & Porro, 2012, Bol & Giani, 2019). The details
are discussed in appendix (A.2.1). (ii) There are two potential attrition issues. First,
individuals may become unwilling (or more willing) to take the survey because of
terrorist attacks. To rule out potential drops in survey collection in correspondence
with terrorist attacks, I compare that survey collection rates in terror-targeted re-
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gions - where the strongest drop should be observed if attrition was a problematic
issue - against all other regions before and after terrorist attacks (A.2.2). I show that
the survey collection rates in areas targeted by terrorist attacks stay constant in the
immediate aftermath of the attacks. Second, individuals may become unwilling (or
more willing) to give a valid answer to either dependent variable because of terrorist
attacks. Further analysis rules out this possibility (A.2.3).
Excludability: No other event than the terrorist attack should affect the outcome.
Two major threats to excludability are addressed: (i) unobserved time-varying trends
and (ii) compound treatment. (i) The observed terror treatment effects may spuri-
ously reflect unobserved time-varying trends. It appears reasonable to choose time
bandwidths that are short enough to minimize attribution issues and large enough to
achieve sufficient statistical power. I assess the robustness of the main outcomes to
varying time bandwidths as well as proposing an augmented specification in which
we increase the number of control variables by including a linear and a quadratic
time trend. In addition, we show that running permutation tests shows that resam-
pling the treatment variable within each country–year systematically results in null
simulated treatment effects (A.2.4). (ii) The terror treatment effects may weigh the
collateral events. For instance, terrorist attacks trigger political reactions that align
with attitude formation. This possibility cannot be ruled out. What can be ruled out,
instead, is that the reported evolution of ethnic prejudice reflects major changes in
immigration-related attitudes that are simultaneously taking place in the sampled
countries for reasons unrelated to terrorism. The appendix reports the treatment
effects for a set of additional survey items that act either as alternative dependent
variables for security fear (A.4.1), or as placebos for it (A.4.2).
Full compliance: For the assignment to the treatment group to be valid, individuals
must be informed about the occurrence of terrorist events. Conversely, individuals
in the treatment group who are unaware of the attack should have been assigned to
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the control group. Noncompliance would bias the treatment effects downward, mak-
ing false positives less likely. Because the assumption of full compliance cannot be
directly tested, it may be more appropriate to label the treatment intention to treat.
Yet two different arguments render plausibility to the assumption of full compliance.
First, my focus on local terrorism makes full compliance more credible because indi-
viduals are more likely to be informed about a terrorist attack if the latter happened
in their country. A similar argument applies when it comes to my focus on murderous
jihadist attacks, which are presumably more salient than the fake and failed attacks
analyzed in the appendix (A.5). Second, an analysis of Google trends during the field-
work period of each attack confirms that the searches for “terrorism” are the highest
on the day of the attacks (A.6).
4 FEAR WITHOUT PREJUDICE
The first four columns of Table 1 show that terrorism increases security fear. The
outcomes are not model dependent: adding socioeconomic covariates (models (ii) and
(iii)) or extracting the outliers through pretreatment matching (model (iv)) results in
minor changes. In the full specification, being interviewed after terrorist attacks in-
creases security fear by about three percentage points. Because ensuring security is
widely considered a primary function of the state, the mean of security fear is rather
high (≈ 3.8, see Figure 2), with 32% of sampled individuals reporting maximum score.
Ceiling effects may hence mitigate the magnitude of the terror treatment effect. In
Table 1, we observe that terrorist attacks cause a slight downward shift in ethnic prej-
udice. According to each model specification, with minor differences along columns (i)
to (iv), the terror treatment effect is negative, yet the effect is mild, and the standard
errors are relatively large. The public reacts to jihadist attacks with fear without
prejudice.
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TABLE 1: FEAR WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Security fear Ethnic prejudice
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Treatment .132 .133 .159 .160 -.033 -.041 -.038 -.037
(.032) (.032) (.036) (.036) (.026) (.026) (.028) (.028)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Domicile FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Matching No No No Yes No No No Yes
N.obs 11,981 11,976 10,019 9,881 11,878 11,870 9,900 9,762
R-squared .14 .15 .17 .17 .19 .20 .20 .20
Notes. The reported coefficients are treatment effects on security fear and ethnic prejudice esti-
mated by OLS. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at individual level. In each
regression, the control group is weighted using entropy balancing. Through the latter, the co-
variates’ distribution in the control group mimics the first and second moment of the equivalent
distribution in the treatment group. I balance the control and treatment group according to the
same variables used as controls in each specification. Each specification includes country-year
fixed effects. Domicile fixed effects account for the level of urbanization of the household. The
treatment variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if the respondent was interviewed after each
of the recorded jihadist attacks, during an interval of 15 days. Controls include income decile (1-
10), education (1-7), age (15-99), gender (0-1), household status (0-1), migration background (0-1)
and employment status (0-1). Outliers’ extraction is carried through Coarsened Exact Matching.
Income is coarsened around the median category (5), education is coarsened at university degree
(5), age is coarsened in intervals of 10 years within the working age following the application of
Blackwell et al. (2009). For each unbalanced dummy variable I apply exact matching. Data include
all nine terror attacks as in Figure 1. Source: ESS, rounds 1-8.
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The empirical pattern holds true across different time horizons and terrorist inci-
dents. Although the analysis presented in Table 1 focus on the very short term (within
15 days after each attack), Figure 3a summarizes the terror treatment effects for al-
ternative time bandwidths. The terror treatment effects are qualitatively and quan-
titatively similar across alternative intervals of time, either shorter or longer. The
left panel of Figure 3a focuses on security fear. It shows that the treatment is the
strongest after one week. They it slightly decays. The right panel of Figure 3a fo-
cuses on ethnic prejudice. It shows that the latter softens to a similar extent across
different bandwidths.
Figure 3b shows that the aggregate increase in security fear is driven by some of the
largest attacks, including the attack perpetrated by Hamas in Tel Aviv in 2003 (22
casualties), the Domodedovo Airport shooting in Moscow in 2008 (38 casualties), and
the Charlie Hebdo shooting in Paris in 2015 (17 casualties). The terror treatment
effect on security fear is also large in one of the smaller scale attacks in the sample
- the attack perpetrated in the Netherlands in 2004 against the Dutch film director
and intellectual Theo Van Gogh. Interestingly, Figure 3b shows that the aggregate
decrease in ethnic prejudice is also driven by some of the largest attacks, including
the attack in Tel Aviv in 2003 (22 casualties), the Charlie Hebdo shooting in 2015 (17
casualties), and the Berlin truck attack in 2016 (12 casualties). Disaggregate findings
indicate that the main terror treatment effects are not driven by a single outlier,
and the heterogeneity at the terror episode level is overall bounded. However, such
analysis suffers from low statistical power, hence the terror treatment effects should
be taken with caution.
Group vs individual threat. The empirical analysis discloses an empirical puzzle.
Although security fear and ethnic prejudice are indeed correlated in the control group
(ρbefore = .11), such correlation drops by 75% (ρafter = .03) precisely when citizens are
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FIGURE 3: TERROR TREATMENT EFFECTS ACROSS TIME, TERRORIST EPISODE, IMMIGRATION
CONCERN AND ETHNIC GROUP.
(A) By time bandwidths. (B) By terrorist episodes.
.
(C) By immigration concern. (D) By ethnic group.
Notes. Each figure plots the terror treatment effects obtained through the same model specification as
in Table 1, adding .95 (whole plot) and .90 (capped plot) confidence intervals. Details about regressions
coefficients, standard errors and number of observations are reported in appendix. Source: ESS.
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exposed to the most salient security threats. What could explain such an empirical
pattern? I argued in section 2.1 that if jihadist attacks are mainly perceived as a
threat to the country, then the resulting threat-perception increases desire for retali-
ation and worsens ethnic prejudice. Instead, if jihadist attacks are mainly perceived
as a threat to one’s personal safety, then the resulting threat-perception induces anx-
iety and risk-aversion, softening ethnic prejudice. Thus, a possible interpretation of
my outcomes is that, in the short-run, jihadist attacks increase perceived individ-
ual threat more than they increase perceived country threat. I now provide indirect
evidence consistent with the proposed mechanism in two complementary ways.
Firstly, like residents in the New York metropolitan area following 9/11 (Huddy et al.,
2005), individuals living in the area targeted by terror attacks should perceive the
strongest anxiety and thus soften their ethnic prejudice to a greater extent than indi-
viduals living elsewhere do. Table 2 reports the coefficients for an additional specifi-
cation in which I split the sample in two depending on whether or not the respondent
lives in the area targeted by the terrorist attack.6 The coefficients in Table 2 strongly
supports this possibility: security fear increases and ethnic prejudice decreases to a
substantially greater extent among respondents living in the area targeted by ter-
ror attacks. The aggregate terror treatment effects in Table 1 are indeed driven by
individuals with higher exposure to the terror threat.
Secondly, anxiety leads citizens to alleviate ideological processing, making public
opinion responses similar across ideological groups that hold otherwise different stances
(see e.g., Joslyn & Haider-Markel, 2018). Since such a phenomenon is typical of anx-
iety, we should expect ideology to unify the public in targeted regions and to polarize
it in others. It should hold that ideology plays no moderating effect in target regions
while potentially polarizing in other regions. The coefficients in Table 2, back such
a mechanism. I interact the terror treatment with a dummy variable that takes the
value of one if the respondent self-reports leftwing (less than 5) on the traditional 1-10
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scale. The interaction effect is positive and non-significant in the target region, in-
dicating that leftwing individuals, who hold on average lower ethnic prejudice, react
to jihadist attacks in a very similar manner to all other individuals (fourth column).
Instead, the interaction effect is negative and significant in other regions (second col-
umn), indicating that ideology does play a role when individuals are less concerned
about their personal safety.
TABLE 2: ANXIETY AND RISK AVERSION.
All regions Target region
Fear Prejudice Fear Prejudice
Treatment 0.16 0.01 0.53 -0.16
(0.05) (0.04) (0.16) (0.09)
Treatment × Leftwing -0.07 -0.14 -0.32 0.22
(0.10) (0.06) (0.32) (0.18)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Domicile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matching Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs 6,895 6,782 548 542
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.37 0.19
Notes. The reported coefficients are treatment effects on security fear and ethnic prej-
udice estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at indi-
vidual level. In each regression, the control group is weighted using entropy balancing.
Through the latter, the covariates’ distribution in the control group mimics the first and
second moment of the equivalent distribution in the treatment group. I balance the
control and treatment group according to the same variables used as controls in each
specification. In this case, however, I also weight and control for regions, which corre-
sponds to NUT2 (NUT3 for the Netherlands). Each specification includes country-year
fixed effects. Domicile fixed effects account for the level of urbanization of the household.
The treatment variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if the respondent was interviewed
after each of the recorded jihadist attacks, during an interval of 15 days. Controls in-
clude income decile (1-10), education (1-7), age (15-99), gender (0-1), household status
(0-1), migration background (0-1) and employment status (0-1). Outliers’ extraction is
carried through Coarsened Exact Matching. Income is coarsened around the median cat-
egory (5), education is coarsened at university degree (5), age is coarsened in intervals
of 10 years within the working age. For each unbalanced dummy variable I apply exact
matching. Data include six out of nine terror attacks in Figure 1. Israeli data drop since
I do not have information about the region where respondents live. Source: ESS, rounds
1-8.
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Realistic vs symbolic threat. In section 2.1, I explain that since jihadist terror-
ism is not uniquely a security threat, but also an economic and cultural one, it is
reasonable to expect that all immigration attitudes evolve in a similar way. I proxy
further immigration-related concerns as follows:
Overall concerns: Immigrants make country worse or better place to live. 1:
Worse; ... ; 10: Better.
Cultural concerns: Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immi-
grants. 1: Undermined; ... ; 10: Enriched.
Economic concerns: Immigration bad or good for country’s economy. 1: Bad; ... ;
10: Good.
Figure 4c confirms that the terror treatment effects on these standard immigration
proxies are null, and follow a similar pattern as those presented in Table 1.
Homogenous vs differentiated outgroup. Previous research has shown that ji-
hadist terrorism is expected to foster discriminatory attitudes not only toward Mus-
lims, but also toward other ethnic minorities (e.g. Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009). Hope-
fully, the seventh round of the ESS includes more detailed information about specific
ethnic groups. The survey items are the following:
Gypsy immigration. Allow many or few Gypsies to come and live in country. 1:
Many; ... ; 4: None.
Jewish immigration. Allow many or few Jews to come and live in country. 1:
Many; ... ; 4: None.
Muslim immigration. Allow many or few Muslims to come and live in country.
1: Many; ... ; 4: None.
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Figure 4d shows that the treatment effect on ethnic prejudice performs similarly
across different ethnic groups. This confirms that security threats lead the public
to undifferentiated responses.
5 CONCLUSION
Governments around the globe did not necessarily make concessions to terrorist groups
(Abrahms, 2012), but sometimes responded to 9/11 by suspending civil liberties (e.g.,
Epifanio, 2011). Whether this social cost was worth it in terms of higher security
is theoretically contestable and empirically unclear (e.g., Waldron, 2003, Daxecker &
Hess, 2013). In this context of policy uncertainty, public opinion is pivotal.
In the current paper, I test whether jihadist attacks jointly increase security fear and
ethnic prejudice. I propose an empirical protocol that exploits the timing of survey in-
terviews, which is random regarding the exact date of the terrorist attacks, to analyze
nine terrorist attacks in six countries between 2002 and 2016. My analysis confirms
that terrorism, particularly in the targeted terror areas and in relation to large-scale
terrorist incidents, spreads fear. This effect survives in the medium run; terrorism
calls for policy responses. Yet within diverse contexts, the public does not give in to
ethnic prejudice towards immigrants and minorities.
These findings offer an important contribution to the empirical literature on terrorism
and public opinion. Largely based on transnational studies and single-case studies,
the extant consensus is that jihadist attacks worsen attitudes towards immigrants
and minorities. Such a consensus should be updated since it does not hold at more
disaggregated geographic levels, whatever time-bandwidth, terrorist episode, type
of immigration attitude and ethnic group one chooses. I argue that the distinction
between (perceived) group and individual threat offers a theoretical basis for the dis-
closed attitudinal pattern.
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Some caveats are in order. While the focus on immigration attitudes is important, it
would be interesting to single out other policy areas that the public link to security
concerns. Support for hawkish foreign policy or extrajudicial practices such as arbi-
trary detention or torture may increase following terrorist attacks. Unfortunately,
the ESS does not include information about these policies. Moreover, my analysis ab-
stracts from the role of leaders’ rhetoric in mitigating the treatment effects. Leaders’
reaction speeches and their media coverage may be exploited to enhance our under-
standing of public responses, allowing for the testing of further hypotheses. Finally,
this paper’s sole focus on the individual level does not allow us to grasp the effects
of institutional and contextual factors that previous research has shown to be key in
moderating ethnic prejudice within an ingroup-outgroup divide (e.g., Quillian, 1995).
Multi-level modeling may complement existing approaches and provide new direc-
tions in the field.
NOTES
1Bandyopadhyay & Sandler (2014) show that, from the perspective of a developed country, immigra-
tion rules that limit unskilled labor from developing countries successfully reduce the risk of terrorist
attacks. This is partially supported by the empirical literature. Bove & Böhmelt (2016) use a se-
ries of spatial temporal autoregressive models and focus on 145 countries for 30 years to study how
immigration flows affect the likelihood of terrorist events. They show that appropriate restrictions
based on the countries of migrants’ origins may help restoring homeland security. Further empirical
research confirms that ethnic polarization, particularly when interacted with urban concentration of
dangerous individuals (Ezcurra, 2017), increases the likelihood of terrorist activities (Danzell, Yeh, &
Pfannenstiel, 2016).
2Consistently, extant quasi-experimental evidence based on transnational studies find that jihadist
attacks worsen attitudes towards immigrants and minorities. Finseraas et al. (2011) show that the
murder of film director Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam, Netherlands on October 2, 2004 increased sup-
port for restrictive immigration policies across European respondents in 17 countries. A similar result
is found in Legewie (2013), who shows that a terrorist attack in Bali, Indonesia on October 12, 2012
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increased anti-immigration attitudes among in Portugal and Poland. Schüller (2016) documents that
9/11 increased anti-immigration attitudes among Germans. Using Eurobarometer survey, Nussio et al.
(2019) show that the terrific terrorist attack at the Bataclan on November 13, 2015 worsened attitudes
toward migrants and refugees without displaying clear geographic patterns across Europe. We know
very little, instead, about the local effect of terrorist attacks. Early evidence from France, instead,
suggests that focusing on the local effect of terrorist attacks yields null effects on ethnic prejudice (Van
Hauwaert & Huber, 2020).
3In appendix, I also study the effect of some jihadist episodes that did not cause any death, as well
as the effect of common murders perpetrated by Muslim citizens.
4Such design is becoming increasingly popular in political science (see Munoz, Falco-Gimeno, &
Hernandez, 2018). It was used in different context e.g. the effect of terrorism on other outcomes (Geys
& Qari, 2017b, Balcells & Torrats-Espinosa, 2018), the effect of electoral outcomes (Giani & Méon,
2017) or sport events (Depetris-Chauvin, Durante, & Campante, 2018) on racial attitudes, or the effect
of policy decisions in the context on political attitudes (Bol, Giani, Blais, & Loewen, 2020).
5In an extreme case, it could be that there is no overlap between control and treatment group before
and after each terrorist attack. The problem would be particularly severe in countries characterized
by large regional heterogeneity. This is, however, not the case. The ESS sampling procedure mitigates
this potential threat to identification. Interviewers are dispatched to collect interviews simultaneously
across different geographic units. As such, the density of survey collection by geographic unit before
and after terrorist attacks are similar.
6For this specification I drop individuals from Israel due to lack of information.
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A Fear without Prejudice in the Shadow of Jihadist Threat
A.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the control and treatment group.
A.2 THREATS TO IDENTIFICATION
I discuss here the main threats to identification discussed in the paper.
A.2.1 POTENTIAL SAMPLE IMBALANCE
Covariates. The irregular daily collection protocol observed in 1 suggests that while
the survey is representative of each country for the whole fieldwork period, it may
not be so within sub-periods. Treated and control units may then be imbalanced
on socioeconomic covariates that correlate with geographic areas. I deal with this
issue by matching untreated and treated units within each sampled country on key
imbalanced socioeconomic covariates prior to the inference based on the contribution
of Iacus, King, & Porro (2012).
Pre-treatment matching requires the following steps. (i) I select a set of covariates
so as to balance out the need to account for key information about units with that of
avoiding the curse of dimensionality. Only proper variables can be selected.1 A rea-
sonable choice is to include all basic controls. (ii) I test the whether the distribution
of each independent variable is unbalanced between control and treatment group for
each terrorist attack. Univariate imbalance does not simply test whether means are
significantly different, but also looks at quartiles of the distribution. (iii) Finally, fol-
lowing the application of King et al. (2010), I only match control and treated units on
significantly unbalanced covariates.2 This concludes the ex ante control for imbalance.
Table 2 provides information about the mean imbalance between the control and
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treated group for each variable, providing some by country descriptive statistics.
Whereas for dummy variables this corresponds to testing whether means are dif-
ferent, for discrete variables (income and education) or continuous variables (age), I
test whether the distribution is significantly imbalanced. After matching individuals
on imbalanced covariates (in bold), I prune those observations that turn out to be un-
matched. It is according to this strategy, therefore, that I extract outliers. The last
four rows provide detailed information about the number of matches among untreated
and treated units.3
Units of sampling. In Germany, both the control and the treatment group include
units from 15 geographic units. The same holds true for Russia (10 geographic units,
both in 2008 and 2001). In other cases, some imbalance in regional rate of survey
collection remains. In France (2015), the control group includes respondents from 21
regions, whereas the treatment group includes respondents from 18 regions. Similar
rate of imbalance characterize the Netherlands (39 geographic unit in the control
group and 32 in the treatment group) and Sweden (20 v. 15). While overall regional
imbalance is very limited, further effort can be made to rule out this potential level of
imbalance. Following Hainmueller (2012), and based on the algorithm presented in
Hainmueller & Xu (2013), I weight control units such that the regional distribution
of respondents in the control groups matches the one in the treatment group (there
is no region sampled in the treatment group and not in the control group). This pre-
processing prunes respondents from geographic units for which there are no data in
the treatment group, weighting all others according to the share of respondents in
each geographic unit in the treatment group. I provide treatment effect with and
without entropy balance, showing that they are very close to each other (3).
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A.2.2 POTENTIAL DROP IN SURVEY COLLECTION
Data collection in Figure 1 shows that, in some cases, the density of collected surveys
falls following the terrorist attack. It is important to discuss whether this happens be-
cause of the attack itself, or whether it is due to other, unrelated reasons. Comparing
the evolution of data collection after the Charlie Hebdo attack in France (2015) and
the attack in Berlin (2016) can be helpful to understand what ’other reasons’ may
include, because the two attacks share similar scale and have been perpetrated in
similar countries. In the former case, the rate of collection increases after the terror-
ist attack, whereas in the second case it decreases. The reason for this, however, has
little to do with terrorist attacks. The attack in Paris took place on January 7, after
Christmas holidays, whereas the attack in Berlin took place right before Christmas,
on the 19th of December.
It must be highlighted that the ESS’s sampling strategy is set before the interviews
are conducted and does not deviate from this. As stated in the sampling guide of the
ESS’s website, “Substitution of non-responding households or individuals (whether
’refusals’, ’non-contacts’ or ’ineligibles’) is not permitted at any stage.” As such, we can
safely exclude the possibility that respondents whose geographic location correlates
with particular attitudes, be substituted ex post with other respondents. In addition,
not only interviewers’ main income is largely based on “per completed interview” (In
the last wave, the latter is worth about 60 euros), but in addition to that interviewers’
contractual arrangements always include bonuses for response rate is over the target
rate or, sometimes, for follow-ups on “difficult” cases. Overall, the organization of the
sampling and the structure of incentives run against drops in collection effort.
The left panel of Figure 2 aggregates all attacks, focusing on an interval of 120 days
before and after the attack. If we restrict the attention to an interval of 15 days after
terrorist attacks, we do not observe any drop in collection effort. One can however
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observe a minor drop in the immediate aftermath of attacks, two days after terrorist
attacks. This drop, however, is very unlikely to be caused by terrorist attacks. Indeed,
the right panel of Figure 2 focuses on the density of survey collection in the geographic
unit where attacks took place. If terrorist attacks were responsible for a decrease
in the rate at which surveys are collected, then the drop should be much stronger
in targeted area. But this is clearly not the case: in the immediate aftermath of
terrorist events, the density of survey collection in the geographic unit where attacks
took place is higher than before.
A.2.3 MISSING VALUES
One further threat to identification is that, following terrorist attacks, interviewed
units are reluctant to answer question pertaining to discriminatory attitudes. This
would result in a significantly higher rate of missing data on dependent variables,
raising a flag of doubt about the fact that, perhaps, a higher rate of missing data
hides discriminatory preferences. Table 4, however, discards this possibility. I test
whether the number of missing data for each of the dependent variables significantly
change due to the occurrence of terrorist attacks, finding no significant result in either
case. I hence conclude that my main results are not affected by a suspicious increase
in missing data.
A.2.4 POTENTIAL REVERSE CAUSALITY
Are terrorist attacks exogenous? The question seems redundant if one focuses on
the strategic nature of terrorism that seeks to unexpectedly hit individuals. But the
relationship between terrorism and support for ethnic discrimination is more complex
than this. The satirical approach of the French magazine Charlie Hebdo towards
Islam, in fact, had spurred resentment among French Muslims prior to the terrorist
attack, possibly altering the attitudes of the French Public prior to the attack.
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In sum, whereas the date of the interview is credibly random with respect to the exact
date of the attack, the location and broad interval of time chosen by terrorists may not
be. Restricting the treatment group to a smaller interval of time (3a) suggests that
the timing of the attack is as good as random. Similarly, in Figure 3, I randomly re-
assign the treatment within countries and test for “permuted terror treatment effects”
on the two main dependent variables. This permutation test strengthens the validity
of terrorist attacks as an exogenous shock to security concerns.
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Control group Treatment group
VARIABLES N mean sd min max N mean sd min max
Security fear 10,407 4.734 1.252 1 6 6,387 4.882 1.162 1 6
Ethnic prejudice 10,342 0.620 0.962 -3 3 6,151 0.622 0.994 -3 3
Female 10,814 1.535 0.499 1 2 6,574 1.550 0.498 1 2
Age 10,767 48.14 19.09 15 100 6,540 46.01 18.38 15 100
Household status 10,801 1.625 0.484 1 2 6,569 1.599 0.490 1 2
Education attainment 10,756 4.082 1.828 1 7 6,522 4.334 1.815 1 7
Income decile 9,058 5.448 2.708 1 10 5,254 5.618 2.783 1 10
Domicile 10,807 2.558 1.258 1 5 6,563 2.306 1.218 1 5
Immigration background 10,816 0.364 0.481 0 1 6,574 0.295 0.456 0 1
Employment status 10,816 0.0690 0.253 0 1 6,574 0.0540 0.226 0 1
Living in targeted area 7,677 0.0676 0.251 0 1 4,694 0.153 0.360 0 1
Value of safety 10,465 2.552 1.319 -1 4 6,416 2.697 1.254 -1 4
Value of equality 10,467 2.021 1.065 1 6 6,399 2.133 1.075 1 6
Value of meritocracy 10,396 3.083 1.443 1 6 6,371 2.921 1.382 1 6
Opposition to different race immigration 10,421 2.473 0.944 1 4 6,216 2.594 0.961 1 4
Opposition to same race immigration 10,495 1.850 0.881 1 4 6,282 1.961 0.969 1 4
Opposition to Gypsy immigration 3,467 3.048 0.970 1 4 778 3.126 0.960 1 4
Opposition to Jewish immigration 3,538 1.759 0.910 1 4 808 1.658 0.862 1 4
Opposition to Muslim immigration 3,516 2.931 0.991 1 4 794 3.016 0.983 1 4
Redistribution 10,650 2.036 1.052 1 5 6,466 2.017 1.030 1 5
Left-right placement 9,925 5.235 2.500 1 0 5,407 5.384 2.323 0 10
Government satisfaction 10,535 4.313 2.464 0 10 6,351 4.531 2.468 0 10
Cultural attitudes towards immigration 10,273 5.618 2.620 0 10 6,152 4.898 2.793 0 10
Economic attitudes towards immigration 10,312 5.041 2.535 0 10 6,096 4.619 2.585 0 10
Generic attitudes towards immigration 10,307 5.031 2.411 0 10 6,137 4.412 2.550 0 10
TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics.
FIGURE 1: Survey collection by region before and after each terrorist attack, by region. The red (gray)
histogram refers to the percentage of surveys collected in each region in the control (treatment) group.
Information is not available for Israel.
(A) Netherlands, 2004. (B) Russia, 2008. (C) Sweden, 2010.
(D) Russia, 2011. (E) France, 2015. (F) Germany, 2016.
(A) All areas. (B) Terror areas only.
FIGURE 2: Density of data collection around terrorist attacks, 120 days before and after.
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Country: IL NL RU SW RU IL FR IL DE
Year: 2003 2004 2008 2010 2011 2012 2015 2015 2016
Deaths (injured): 22 (NA) 1 (1) 3 (0) 1 (2) 38 (168) 3 (2) 17 (16) 1 (1) 12 (48)
Income (0-10) -.82 -.09 .89 .19 .96 .50 .27 .05 .19
Education (0-7) -.03 .42 .26 .26 .17 .01 .45 .06 -19
Age (0-99) 3.84 -.71 -.27 -4.53 -2.52 -3.70 -2.15 1.25 -3.44
Female (0-1) .04 .06 -.05 -.01 -.05 -.04 .00 -.03 .00
Household status (0-1) .06 .02 -.12 -.08 -.03 -.01 -.01 -.00 -.07
Immigration background (0-1) -.08 -.04 .02 .08 .01 -.20 .07 -.03 .04
Employment status (0-1) .08 -.02 .00 .01 .00 .01 -.00 -.06 .04
Degree of urbanization (0-4) -.17 -.07 -.67 -.15 .21 .16 -.53 .05 .04
N. untreated 608 1106 252 954 767 1131 1604 2008 2386
Matches 512 1105 250 937 766 1115 1490 2008 2380
N. treated 149 762 683 542 1816 1350 297 530 444
Matches 133 758 583 539 1765 1322 290 530 441
Notes: Each column reports the difference in means between control and treatment group for each single terror
attack. Bold numbers indicate that the distribution of a that covariate is significantly different at least at p < .1
in at least one quartile of the distribution. Source: ESS, rounds 1-8.
TABLE 2: Univariate imbalance.
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Date 2003 2004 2008 2010 2011 2012 2015 2015 2016





Hamas Al Quaeda Hamas Isis
Network Emirate Emirate
Casualties: 22 1 3 1 38 3 17 1 12
Security fear
(0-5)
Treatment .211 .235 .078 .250 .268 .102 .222 -.120 -.040
SE (.127) (.092) (.153) (.152) (.068) (.074) (.115) (.108) (.119)
Weighted NA .247 -.160 .193 .261 NA .269 NA -.027
SE NA (.095) (.178) (.154) (.068) NA (.111) NA (.118)
N. Obs 453 1,064 323 916 898 928 1,561 1,510 2,228
Ethnic prejudice
(0-6)
Treatment -.147 .008 -.005 .024 .069 .002 -.119 .065 -.084
SE (.137) (.053) (.105) (.036) (.075) (.091) (.051) (.111) (.049)
Weighted -.146 .031 .126 .011 .041 NA -.083 NA -.083
SE (.129) (.049) (.094) (.038) (.074) NA (.051) NA (.050)
N. Obs 438 1,072 296 926 839 876 1,532 1,562 2,221
Domicile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matching Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Output estimated by OLS. Controls include income decile (1-10),education (1-7), age (15-99), gender (0-1)
household status (0-1), migration background (0-1) and employment status (0-1). Standard error in parentheses.
Include region fixed effects (not available for Israel). Source: ESS, rounds 1-8.
TABLE 3: Terror treatment effects on security fear and ethnic prejudice, by terrorist incident.
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TABLE 4: TERROR TREATMENT EFFECTS ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF MISSING VALUES.
Security fear Ethnic prejudice
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Treatment .00 .00 .00 .00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Domicile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matching Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs 10,309 10,309 10,309 10,168 10,309 10,309 10,309 10,168
R-squared .02 .02 .02 .02 .03 .03 .03 .03
Notes. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. The reported coefficients are estimated by OLS. Both dependent
variables are dummies taking the value 1 if the respondent did not answer the question relative to
security fear and ethnic prejudice and 0 else. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
individual level. In each regression, the control group is weighted using entropy balancing. Through
the latter, the covariates’ distribution in the control group mimics the first and second moment of the
equivalent distribution in the treatment group. I balance the control and treatment group according to
the same variables used as controls in each specification. Each specification includes country-year fixed
effects. Domicile fixed effects account for the level of urbanization of the household. The treatment
variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if the respondent was interviewed after each of the recorded
jihadist attacks, during an interval of 15 days. Controls include income decile (1-10), education (1-7),
age (15-99), gender (0-1), household status (0-1), migration background (0-1) and employment status
(0-1). Outliers’ extraction is carried through Coarsened Exact Matching. Income is coarsened around
the median category (5), education is coarsened at university degree (5), age is coarsened in intervals
of 10 years within the working age. For each unbalanced dummy variable I apply exact matching.
Data include all nine terror attacks as in Figure 1. Source: ESS, rounds 1-8.
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FIGURE 3: DENSITY OF PERMUTED TERROR TREATMENT EFFECTS AFTER 10,000 MONTECARLO SIM-
ULATIONS.




In the paper, I focus on terror treatment effects and do not report coefficients and
standard errors for controls. Table 5 replicates Table 1 and report coefficients and
standard errors for controls as well. This helps profiling the socioeconomic and demo-
graphic factors that mostly correlate with security fear and ethnic prejudice.
A.3.2 TIME TRENDS
In Table 6 we use the same specification used for Table 1, but further control for a
possible trend in discriminatory attitudes, as well as the squared trend to account for
possible non-linearities. Treatment effects are slightly larger in absolute magnitude
than those obtained with the main specification. Neither the linear nor the quadratic
time trend entail a significant effect in most specifications.
A.3.3 ORDERED LOGIT
Table 5 replicates Table 1 but accounts for possible non-linearities in the data gener-
ating process of the two main dependent variables by running an ordered logit model.
Reported odd-ratios indicate qualitatively similar treatment effects.
A.3.4 CLUSTERING BY DATE OR COUNTRY
In Table 9 we replicate the full model in Table 1 by clustering standard errors at date
level, finding result that are equal to those in Table 1 until the third decimal. In Table
9 we replicate the full model in Table 1 by clustering standard errors at country level,
finding similar values as in Table 1.
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A.3.5 ALTERNATIVE CLUSTERING STRATEGY
One important issue is that country-year fixed effects do not fully account for within-
cluster correlation or heteroscedasticity. To deal with this potential downward bias in
standard errors, one would cluster standard errors at the country-year level. Since,
however, the number of clusters is limited (< 30), this approach is likely to underes-
timate standard errors even if the number of observation per cluster is high, result-
ing in excess false positives. Therefore, following advice found in Esarey & Menger
(2018), I apply a Cluster Adjusted T-Statistics (CATs) procedure based on Ibragimov
& Müller (2010). The procedure, based on the idea that the data of each cluster can
be thought off as a random draw from the total possible observations of the data, is
suitable when the number of data in each cluster is relatively large and the num-
ber of clusters is low. The logic is quite simple: the model is run separately within
every cluster, yielding estimates for the treatment effect in each cluster, then cal-
culating confidence intervals and test statistics using the mean and variance of the
collection of cluster-specific coefficient values. As such, standard errors that are ro-
bust to clustering even with a very small number of clusters. Simulations by Esarey
& Menger (2018) show that this procedure outperforms, compared to other avail-
able clustered robust standard error procedures and most notably Pairs cluster boot-
strapped t-statistics and Wild cluster bootstrapped t-statistics (both at limiting false
positives and at detecting true positives. Table 10 provides terror treatment effects
under this alternative specification, showing results close to those found in Table 1.
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TABLE 5: MAIN TABLE, INCLUDING CONTROLS.
Security fear Ethnic prejudice
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Treatment .13 .16 .16 .16 -.03 -.04 -.04 -.04
(.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Age .00 -.00 -.00 .01 -.00 -.00
(.00) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Education -.04 -.04 -.04 -.01 -.01 -.01
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Income -.00 -.00 .00 .02 .02 .02
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Female .05 .04 .04 .08 .07 .07
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Household -.05 -.07 -.07 .02 .01 .01
status (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Age .00 .00 .00 .00
squared (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Unemployed .04 .04 .09 .09
(.07) (.07) (.06) (.06)
Immigration .10 .10 .26 .26
background (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Constant 3.52 3.13 3.27 3.28 3.38 2.96 3.08 3.08
(.06) (.16) (.21) (.21) (.03) (.12) (.16) (.16)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Domicile FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Matching No No No Yes No No No Yes
N.obs 11,981 10,019 10,019 9,881 11,878 9,900 9,900 9,762
R-squared .14 .17 .17 .17 .19 .19 .20 .20
Notes. This Table reproduces Table 1 but reports coefficients for each control variable included in
the main specification. Source: ESS, rounds 1-8.
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TABLE 6: MAIN TEST, INCLUDING TIME TREND.
Security fear Ethnic prejudice
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Treatment 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Trend 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trend 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
squared (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Domicile FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Matching No No No Yes No No No Yes
N.obs 11,981 10,019 10,019 9,881 11,878 9,900 9,900 9,762
R-squared 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.20
Notes. The reported coefficients are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors are clustered at coun-
try level. The control group in each regression is weighted using entropy balancing on all covariates
included in the specification. The covariates’ distribution in the control group mimics the first and
second moment of the equivalent distribution in the treatment group. Each specification includes
country-year fixed effects. Controls include income decile (1-10), education (1-7), age (15-99), gen-
der (0-1), household status (0-1), migration background (0-1) and employment status (0-1). Outliers’
extraction is carried through Coarsened Exact Matching. Income is coarsened around the median
category (5), education is coarsened at university degree (5), age is coarsened in intervals of 10 years
within the working age. For each unbalanced dummy variable I apply exact matching. Data include
all nine terror attacks as in Figure 1. Source: ESS, rounds 1-8.
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TABLE 7: MAIN TEST, ORDERED LOGIT SPECIFICATION.
Security fear Ethnic prejudice
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Treatment .23 .26 .27 .27 -.09 -.11 -.10 -.10
(.05) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.07)
Age .01 -.01 -.01 .01 -.01 -.01
(.00) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.01)
Education -.06 -.06 -.06 -.02 -.01 -.02
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Income -.00 .00 .00 .05 .05 .05
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Female .14 .13 .13 .20 .18 .18
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.07) (.07)
Household -.10 -.12 -.12 .07 .03 .04
status (.06) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.08) (.08)
Age .00 .00 .00 .00
squared (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Unemployed .08 .09 .12 .13
(.12) (.12) (.14) (.14)
Immigration .17 .17 .55 .55
background (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Domicile FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Matching No No No Yes No No No Yes
N.obs 11,981 10,019 10,019 9,881 11,878 9,900 9,900 9,762
Notes. The reported coefficients are treatment effects on security fear and ethnic bias estimated
by Ordered logit model. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at individual level.
In each regression, the control group is weighted using entropy balancing. Through the latter, the
covariates’ distribution in the control group mimics the first and second moment of the equivalent
distribution in the treatment group. I balance the control and treatment group according to the
same variables used as controls in each specification. Each specification includes country-year
fixed effects. Domicile fixed effects account for the level of urbanization of the household. The
treatment variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if the respondent was interviewed after each
of the recorded jihadist attacks, during an interval of 15 days. Controls include income decile (1-
10), education (1-7), age (15-99), gender (0-1), household status (0-1), migration background (0-1)
and employment status (0-1). Outliers’ extraction is carried through Coarsened Exact Matching.
Income is coarsened around the median category (5), education is coarsened at university degree
(5), age is coarsened in intervals of 10 years within the working age. For each unbalanced dummy
variable I apply exact matching. Data include all nine terror attacks as in Figure 1. Source: ESS,
rounds 1-8.
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TABLE 8: MAIN TEST, CLUSTERING (DATE LEVEL).
Security fear Ethnic prejudice
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Treatment 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.16 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Domicile FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Matching No No No Yes No No No Yes
N.obs 11,981 10,019 10,019 9,881 11,878 9,900 9,900 9,762
R-squared 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20
Notes. The reported coefficients are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the date level. The control group in each regression is weighted using entropy balancing on all
covariates included in the specification. The covariates’ distribution in the control group mimics
the first and second moment of the equivalent distribution in the treatment group. Each specifi-
cation includes country-year fixed effects. Controls include income decile (1-10), education (1-7),
age (15-99), gender (0-1), household status (0-1), migration background (0-1) and employment sta-
tus (0-1). Outliers’ extraction is carried through Coarsened Exact Matching. Income is coarsened
around the median category (5), education is coarsened at university degree (5), age is coarsened
in intervals of 10 years within the working age. For each unbalanced dummy variable I apply
exact matching. Data include all nine terror attacks as in Figure 1. Source: ESS, rounds 1-8.
A.18
TABLE 9: MAIN TEST, CLUSTERING (STANDARD).
Security fear Ethnic prejudice
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Treatment .13 .16 .16 .16 -.03 -.04 -.04 -.04
(.06) (.05) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Domicile FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Matching No No No Yes No No No Yes
N.obs 11,981 10,019 10,019 9,881 11,878 9,900 9,900 9,762
R-squared .14 .17 .17 .17 .19 .19 .20 .20
Notes. The reported coefficients are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors are clustered at
country level. The control group in each regression is weighted using entropy balancing on all
covariates included in the specification. The covariates’ distribution in the control group mim-
ics the first and second moment of the equivalent distribution in the treatment group. Each
specification includes country-year fixed effects. Controls include income decile (1-10), education
(1-7), age (15-99), gender (0-1), household status (0-1), migration background (0-1) and employ-
ment status (0-1). Outliers’ extraction is carried through Coarsened Exact Matching. Income is
coarsened around the median category (5), education is coarsened at university degree (5), age is
coarsened in intervals of 10 years within the working age. For each unbalanced dummy variable
I apply exact matching. Data include all nine terror attacks as in Figure 1. Source: ESS, rounds
1-8.
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TABLE 10: MAIN TABLE, ALTERNATIVE CLUSTERING (ADJUSTED T-STATISTICS).
Security fear Ethnic prejudice
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Treatment .11 .13 .12 .13 -.04 -.02 -.02 -.02
(.05) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.03)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Domicile FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Matching No No No Yes No No No Yes
N.obs 11,981 10,019 10,019 9,881 11,878 9,900 9,900 9,762
Notes. The reported coefficients are estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors are clustered at
country level using the Cluster Adjusted T-Statistics procedure. The standard errors returned by
the CATs procedure are calculated from the distribution of parameter estimates across the mod-
els run in each cluster. These country-level statistics are pooled to produce the reported results.
This is part of the reason whjy coefficients are different from those opbserved ion the previous
Table where clustering is "standard". Moreover, unlike for previous regression, weighting is not
available (errors are bootstrapped). Each specification includes country-year fixed effects. Con-
trols include income decile (1-10), education (1-7), age (15-99), gender (0-1), household status
(0-1), migration background (0-1) and employment status (0-1). Outliers’ extraction is carried
through Coarsened Exact Matching. Income is coarsened around the median category (5), edu-
cation is coarsened at university degree (5), age is coarsened in intervals of 10 years within the
working age. For each unbalanced dummy variable I apply exact matching. Data include all nine
terror attacks as in Figure 1. Source: ESS, rounds 1-8.
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A.4 FURTHER ATTITUDES
A.4.1 PLACEBO AND ALTERNATIVE PROXIES FOR SECURITY FEAR
I replicate the main analysis on three additional survey items. The survey items used
are the following:
Value of Safety: Important to live in safe surroundings. 1: Disagree strongly; ...
; 5: Agree strongly.
Value of Equality. Important that people are treated equally and receive equal
opportunity. 1: Agree strongly; ... ; 5: Disagree strongly.
Value of Meritocracy: Important to be successful and that people recognize
achievements. 1: Agree strongly; ... ; 5: Disagree strongly.
The first item can be seen as a robustness check for the dependent variable security
fear, whereas the other two refer to values that are not less obviously impacted by
terrorist attacks. Sub-figure 5a confirms that whereas terror treatment effects are
positive and significant for value of safety, the placebo-value proxies are left unaf-
fected by terrorist attacks
A.4.2 PLACEBO PREFERENCES
I run a placebo test on policy preferences that are not directly related to terrorism.
The survey items used are the following:
Redistribution: Government should reduce differences in income levels. 1: Agree
strongly; ... ; 5: Disagree strongly.
Left-right placement: In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Us-
ing this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the
left and 10 means the right? 1: Left; ... ; 10: Right.
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Government satisfaction: Gays and lesbians should be free to live life as they
wish. 1: Very dissatisfied; ... ; 10: Very satisfied.
Sub-figure 5b suggests that my empirical design is not likely to yield spurious results,
as none of the tests reject the null hypotheses.
A.5 FAKE AND FAILED ATTACKS
I study seven further attacks, limited to European countries, in the same manner.4
The first category, fake attacks, refer to murderous attacks perpetrated by Muslims
(or individuals believed to be Muslims in reason of their ethnic background) for which
there was, however, no terrorist plot. The second category, failed attacks, refer to
terrorist plots that caused no victims.
A.5.1 EXAMPLES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS
It is worth giving three examples to clarify at best when an attack qualifies as terror-
ist attack according to my definition and when it does not:
Terrorist attack. November 4, 2003 (Amsterdam). Mohammed Bouyeri, a promi-
nent member of the Hofstad group, a radical Islamic network that Al Quaeda
repeatedly mentioned in propaganda videos, killed the Dutch film director Theo
van Gogh, who had expressed critical views about radical Islam. The attack is
recorded in the GTD and falls in the fieldwork period of the second wave of the
ESS. This event qualifies as terror attacks according to my definition and can
be studied given the survey logistic. It belongs therefore to my case studies.
Fake terrorist attack. January 14, 2003 (Manchester). Kamel Bourgass, an il-
legal Algerian immigrant and Jihadist sympathizer, killed with a kitchen knife
a British police detective during an operation intended to catch illegal immi-
grants. The attack is not a terrorist attack and hence is not recorded in theGTD,
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but does fall in the fieldwork period of the first wave of the ESS. It is recorded,
however, in a politicized “terrorist data-set”, the thereligionofpeace.com, that in-
cludes events of common crime perpetrated by Muslims as “terrorist attacks”. I
study it as a “fake terrorist attack” (A.5.2).
Failed terrorist attack. September 29, 2010 (Leicestershire). British authorities
were alerted by Saudi intelligence that there were parcels carrying explosive
devices on board. Four militants were arrested in connection with the attack.
Al Qaeda Organization in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the
attack. While there was a clear terror plot carried out by affiliated Jihadist,
the attack did not result in any victim. I study this attack as a “failed terrorist
attack” (A.5.3).
A.5.2 FAKE ATTACKS
Politicized media treat common murders perpetrated by individuals believed to be
Muslims as terrorist attacks. On the overall population, those murderous events
should not change either the security fear or the ethnic prejudice. Figure 5 plots the
daily distribution for fake terrorist attacks. I found this event in a popular website
that lists a large set of alleged jihadist terrorist attacks perpetrated during the last
two decades and refer to them as “fake terrorist attack”.5 I include any murderous
“fake terrorist attacks” that occurred in the EU available from 2003 to 2016 in the
thereligionofpeace.com and not in GTD (last check: August 15, 2017).6 Tables 11 and
11 show that neither the security fear nor the ethnic prejudice change significantly
after each of these attacks.
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A.5.3 FAILED ATTACKS
Some terrorist plots organized by individuals affiliated with terrorist organization
fail, causing no victims. I collect all such cases available in the GTD dataset, check
again if they occurred during the fieldwork period of the ESS and analyze them in
the same manner as I did for successful attacks. Figure 6 shows where the discon-
tinuity takes place and provides a description of those plots. Tables 13 and 14 show
respectively that in none of these cases either the security fear or the ethnic prejudice
change significantly.
A.6 ONLINE SEARCH
The social desirability of racially unbiased attitudes provides another channel that
may explain the documented evolution of immigration-related attitudes around ter-
rorist attacks. Because the ESS is conducted face to face, the respondents may be
reluctant to truthfully report their policy preferences, fearing the fact that racially
biased attitudes place a social stigma on those who hold them. As such, it may still
be the case that the individuals do turn toward racially biased policies following ter-
rorist attacks but do not report this increase in racial bias, implying a downward bias
in our estimates. This explanation cannot be entirely ruled out. Yet there are two
reasons that limit the explanatory power of this channel.
The first reason is that, as shown in a recent paper by Bursztyn, Egorov, & Fiorin
(2017), social norms can sharply change in correspondence with major events, such
as the election of Donald Trump. Terrorist attacks may represent similar critical
junctures because the racist stances of some opinion leaders tend to legitimate dis-
criminatory attitudes in the public. Moreover, it is unclear whether the report of
discriminatory policy attitudes as measured in my dependent variable are truly a
taboo. Because the proxy is not particularly intrusive, in the whole control (treat-
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ment) group, 39.5% (36.1%) of the respondents self-reported stronger opposition to
different race immigration than same-race immigration.
The interviewers may behave differently online when they do not face the perspective
of being stigmatized for their attitudes. This is entirely possible. At the aggregate
level, though, it does not seem to be overwhelming. Figure 7 reports the google trends
for “Immigration”, “Terrorism” and “Racism” for the same sample of countries used
in the main analysis and within the same interval of time. After downloading google
trends for each key word in the relevant space-time corresponding to the fieldwork
periods in Figure 1, I average them to obtain a single measure. We observe that
searches for “Terrorism” spike in correspondence of terrorist attacks, but with no
correlation with respect to search for immigration, which is salient, or racism, which
is less so, consistently with the main findings.
A.7 CONDITIONAL EFFECTS
In this subsection, to study the extent through which socioeconomic variables affects
responses in preferences, I interact the treatment with three main socioeconomic vari-
ables: gender, age and education. Overall, as Table 15 shows, socioeconomic variables
play no decisive role.
I start by looking at the effect of socioeconomic variables in shaping security fear.
Whereas gender and education play no role in mitigating individual responses, the
treatment effect is significantly weaker among individuals aged more than 65. Table
15 discloses that the terror treatment effect on ethnic prejudice is significant among
men.
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FIGURE 4: TERROR TREATMENT EFFECTS ON FURTHER ATTITUDES.
(A) Value attitudes. (B) Ideological attitudes.
gdf
Notes. Each figure plots terror treatment effects obtained through the same model specification as in
Table 1, adding .95 (whole plot) and .90 (capped plot) confidence intervals. The top-right graph is based
on data from ESS round 7 only (due to the unavailability of the survey proxy in other surveys). Source:
ESS.
(A) U.K., 2003. (Crime against
Police) On 14 January, A police
detective and father of three is
stabbed to death by a Muslim
terrorist.
(B) France, 2003. (Hate crime)
On 19 November, two Jews are
brutally murdered by Muslims
in separate attacks in Paris.
(C) Austria, 2007. (Common
murder) On October 10, In an
’honor attack’ a Muslim shoots
a man, then cuts off his penis.
(D) Austria, 2015. (Common
murder) On March 10, A ’mi-
grant’ stabs an older man to
death on the grounds that his
music was against Islam.
FIGURE 5: Data collection around fake terrorist attacks. The description of the event is copied from
thereligionofpeace.com.
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TABLE 11: SECURITY FEAR, FAKE ATTACKS.
UK 2003 FR 2003 AT 2007 AT 2015 ALL
Treatment .09 -.05 .07 .02 .02
(.17) (.17) (.07) (.08) (.01)
Country FE . . . . Yes
Domicile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matching Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs 1,733 1,311 1,255 950 3,938
R-squared .08 .08 .09 .04 .07
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01 .
TABLE 12: ETHNIC PREJUDICE, FAKE ATTACKS.
UK 2003 FR 2003 AT 2007 AT 2015 ALL
Treatment -.06 -.04 -.02 .06 -.00
(.07) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.03)
Country FE . . . . Yes
Domicile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matching Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs 1,943 1,378 1,240 925 4,108
R-squared .04 .02 .03 .04 .03
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01 .
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(A) France, 2008. On December 12, a
group calling itself the Afghan Revolu-
tionary Front planted a bundle of dyna-
mite in the third-floor restroom of the
menswear department inside the Print-
emps department store in Paris, Ile-de-
France, France. The group sent a let-
ter to police saying several bombs were
planted in the department store and that
they demanded that France withdraw
from Afghanistan.
(B) U.K., 2010. On September 29, in
East Midlands Airport in Lockington, Le-
icestershire, Great Britain, British au-
thorities were alerted by Saudi intelli-
gence that there were parcels carrying
explosive devices on board. Four mili-
tants were arrested in connection with
the attack. Al Qaeda Organization in the
Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibil-
ity for the attack.
(C) Germany, 2016. On December 5
an explosive device was discovered and
defused at a Christmas market in Lud-
wigshafen, Germany. The assailant as a
12-year-old child and posited that he had
been inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL). ISIL then claimed
responsibility for the attack.
FIGURE 6: Data collection around failed terrorist attacks.
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TABLE 13: SECURITY FEAR, FAILED ATTACKS.
FR 2008 UK 2010 DE 2016 ALL
Treatment -.01 .01 0.06 0.03
(.17) (.08) (.08) (.06)
Country FE . . . Yes
Domicile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matching Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs 1,591 1,013 2,123 4,727
R-squared .09 .03 .07 .04
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01 .
TABLE 14: ETHNIC PREJUDICE, FAILED ATTACKS.
FR 2008 UK 2010 DE 2016 ALL
Treatment -.06 .01 -.06 -.02
(.07) (.04) (.04) (.03)
Country FE . . . Yes
Domicile FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matching Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs 1,730 984 2,116 4,668
R-squared .04 .04 .03 .05
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01 .
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FIGURE 7: Online correlation search for “Immigration” (dashed line), “Terrorism” (regular line) and
“Racism” (dotted line). In the x−axis, time interval around each terrorist attacks (30 days before
and after each attack). In the y−axis, average volume of google search for each topic across terrorist
episodes. Units in the y−axis use information on search traffic on Google browser to compute means
relative to an arbitrary initial value with respect to which each data point is scaled. (Israel 2003 is
excluded since Google trends started in 2004).
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TABLE 15: MAIN TEST, SOCIOECONOMIC ASPECTS.
Security fear Ethnic prejudice
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
Treatment .28 .36 .10 - .20 -.07 -.04
(.11) (.10) (.04) (.08) (.09) (.03)
Treatment × Female - .08 .10
(.07) (.06)
Treatment × Age -.01 .00
(.00) (.01)
Treatment × Education .01 - .05
(.18) (.05)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Domicile FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matching Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs 9,881 9,881 9,881 9,762 9,762 9,762
R-squared .17 .17 .17 .20 .20 .20
Notes. This Table reproduces Table 1 but reports coefficients for each control variable
included in the main specification and adds interactions with main SES covariates.
Source: ESS, rounds 1-8.
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A.8 A FORMAL MODEL OF PARTICIPATION TO JIHADIST ACTIVITY
In the paper, I propose a simple loss function that captures in the most parsimonious
way a tradeoff implied by an ethnic bias in immigration rules. The latter is micro-
founded here through a simple model.
There are a Government G that chooses the immigration policy to minimize terrorist
activity, a jihadist organization J that recruits out-group individuals to maximize
it, and a positive mass m of out-group individuals that solve a leisure vs. terrorist
activity tradeoff.
Without incurring any cost, the government chooses y ∈ (−1, 1) , which captures the
immigration policy content as follows:
positive values indicating an “ethnic bias in immigration rules”;
0 indicating “neutral immigration rules”;
negative values indicating “affirmative action in immigration rules”.
After observing this decision, the terrorist organization sets an income w to affiliate
jihadists, and individuals choose their terrorist supply.
Setup. I assume that an ethnic bias in immigration policies, by foreclosing out-
group individuals, reduces the pool of potential terrorists. Out-group individuals
tradeoff terrorist activity and leisure. In this parsimonious model, an ethnic bias acts
a linear tax on leisure and hence reduces the opportunity cost of terrorist activity.
Under quasilinear preferences, this increases unambiguously the intensive margin of
terrorist activity.
There is a mass of m of out-group individuals. An ethnic bias in immigration policy -
by allowing in-group individuals while foreclosing out-group ones - reduces the mass
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of out-group to m (1− y) .7
Each out-group individual obtains an exogenous income normalized to 1 from the
regular labour market, which I do not model here. Individual i can participate to
the jihadist activity. His benefit depends on terrorist participation p and leisure `
according to the following quasilinear specification:
ui (p, `) = p+ (1− y) ln (`) . (A.1)
The time constraint is given by
h+ ` ≤ θi + 1,
where θi is the type of i and is drawn from a uniform distribution U∈ (0, 1) .Higher val-
ues indicate that i has a larger amount of free time, and in equilibrium imply higher
terrorist activity. This would indicate that, for instance, unemployed individuals are
ceteris paribus more likely to join jihadist organization.
In A.1, an ethnic bias in immigration rules acts as a linear tax (or subsidy, if nega-
tive) on the leisure of out-group individuals. As such, from the perspective of i, it re-
duces (or increases) the opportunity cost of terrorist activity. This assumption seeks
to capture in the most parsimonious way the idea pioneered by Bueno de Mesquita &
Dickson (2007) that lowering the welfare of out-group individuals results in a higher
likelihood to turn them into the terrorist activity.
I assume that a jihadist organization maximizes terrorist activity T according to a
linear production function T (k,H) = kH, where k ∈ (0, 1) is an exogenous linear pro-
ductivity parameter and H is the total number of hours of terrorist activity supplied
by out-group individuals. The jihadist organization maximizes
uJ (k,H) = (k − w)H, (A.2)
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where w is the hourly benefit granted to affiliated jihadists. The latter can be thought
to be an income as well as non-material benefits. Notice that the chosen immigration
rule does not enter directly the utility function of terrorists. It affects, however, the
jihadist organization’s recruitment process.
The objective of the government is to minimize terrorist threat T . Utility can be
written as
uG (k,H) = − (k − w)H. (A.3)
Hence the government - and our rational, aligned, policy instrumental survey respon-
dent, minimizes the jihadist threat by solving
y argmin uJ (k,H) .
To break ties, I assume that in case of indifference between y′ and y, y′  y if y′ ≥ y.
This choice accounts for the fact that, while policy concerns are priority, the govern-
ment would ceteris paribus prefer to restrict the immigration of out-group individuals,
possibly due to cultural or re-election concerns.
Equilibrium. In stage 2, the jihadist organization maximizes terrorist activity. First
order condition of A.2 implies w = k. Denoting by h̄ the average terrorist activity sup-
plied by jihadists and by n the total number of affiliated jihadists, we can write the
total terrorist activity as H = h̄ × n. Hence, the jihadist organization is indifferent
between the extensive and intensive margin of terrorist activity.
We now determine the optimal supply of terrorist activity. Denoting by h the number
of hours spent on terrorist activity, the budget constraint can be written as c = wh,
where w = k is the benefit received from the jihadist organization. As such, taking
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y, k and θi as given, i solves
max
h
ui (c, `) = c+ (1− y) ln (`)
s.t h = θi + 1− `.
The first order condition allows us to write down the intensive margin of the terrorist
activity:8











and hence, for any value of y ∈ (−1, 1), an ethnic bias immigration rules increases the
intensive margin of terrorist activity.
From A.4, out-group i optimally sets hi (k, y, γi) = 0 if θi ≤ 1−y−kk . The probability that
i “affiliates”, i.e. participates even minimally to the terrorist activity, is the extensive
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and so the condition
y ≥ 1− k (A.7)
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is sufficient so that a an ethnic bias in immigration rules decreases the extensive mar-
gin of terrorist activity.
In stage 1, the government takes h and k as given and minimizes terrorist activity.









First order condition reveals that H has a maximum at y∗max = 1− 23k. Since k ∈ (0, 1) ,
it is always under a racially-biased policy that terrorist activity is the highest.
The optimal immigration policy of the government requires setting
y∗min = 1− 2k. (A.8)
Hence, the minimization problem of the government has a unique solution.9 Impor-
tantly, A.8 can be either positive or negative depending on the level of productivity
of the organization.10 The more productive the jihadist organization, the more im-
portant the intensive margin becomes relative to the extensive margin. Consistently,
if we think of a jihadist attack as a signal that the organization is becoming more
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